Design: Normative, conceptually based Purpose: The paper presents asset recognition criteria based on the idea that an asset should be functional, separable and measurable and that financial recognition should be triggered by the recognition of an artefact. We apply these criteria to four organisational assets, that is, those intangible assets that are unlikely to be reported in the accounting domain.
Introduction
In the accounting domain 'asset measurement', notably, transactions-based measurement, drives the 'asset recognition' process based on the reasoning that if one can reliably measure an intangible asset (IA), de facto, one has simultaneously recognised it [a] . In the intellectual capital (IC) domain, though, this logic is rightly reversed otherwise one cannot be too sure of what one is measuring. So, an equivalent opposite stance in the IC domain refers to structuralisation (Johnson, 2002) : the a-priori process of turning the unrecognisable, intangible, tacit knowledge in a person's brain into a recognisable, tangible, explicit form. In this paper we present artefact-based asset recognition criteria as a form of structuralisation.
Artefact-based asset recognition criteria could be a conduit through which intellectual capital could enter the accounting domain, a domain dominated by the maintenance of financial capital, not intellectual capital.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[a]
An often quoted and humorous analogy used to refute the need to recognise an intangible asset, other than on the basis of a measurement, is that if a thing has some of the characteristics of a dog, for instance, it barks like a dog, then it must be a dog. One does not need to see or physically touch it to be able to recognise it as a dog! However, this is a far from satisfactory way of recognising a dog, let alone the type of dog. What is required is a more precision so that the separable recognition of a dog, according to some criteria, cannot be confused with, say, the separable recognition of a wolf. Worst still, what if it turned out to be a man-made recording of a dog and there was no animal at all. One cannot imagine, for example, the medical profession adopting a similar stance: the illness has some of the characteristics of influenza but then it turns out to be meningitis! The medical profession is able to support operational definitions and assessment criteria for the diagnosis of illnesses through scientific testing, however, in accounting such procedures appear to be less well articulated.
-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An implication of the introductory paragraph is that the terms IA and IC are interchangeable whereas actually the delineation is unclear -see Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1 here Nevertheless, we have chosen the IA pathway because we wish to only adopt the money metric of the accounting domain in respect of the asset recognition criteria presented herein.
The epistemological foundation of financial accounting is mostly grounded on definitions and rules of which the definition of an asset is a central feature (ASB, 1999, para4.7-23; FASB, 1985, para6.25-33; IASB, 2001, para49, 53-59) , the latest revision being:
"An asset of an entity is a present right, or other access, to an existing economic resource with the ability to generate economic benefits to the entity" (IASB Update, December 2007 at www.iasb.org.uk)
On this basis, IC could be regarded as "…an existing economic resource…".
However, as Weetman (1989) rightly points out, the need to define a resource simply replaces the need to define an asset. The point is that the above definition is capable of wide interpretation and, therefore, facilitates similarly wide accounting discretion as to what will or will not count as an asset (see Samuelson (1996) and Schuetze (1993) for critiques, historically).
Gerboth (1987) argues that the existence of definitions hardly matters at all in deciding most issues of real-world consequence and in this vain we detach ourselves from the definitional approach to advance instead the case for the use of artefact-based [b] asset recognition criteria as presented in the fourteen descriptors (rows) in summary in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 here
There is no single source that could be said to inform on the content of Table 1 though the starting point for its construction was grounded on Honoré (1961) . So, the construction of Table 1 is a product of the authors' invention over many years of exposure to multi-disciplinary literatures. Many of the constructed criteria refer to rights but rights are empty without some physical and legal evidence that they are a business entity's rights, otherwise, anyone could potentially claim them. Thus, we refer to the need for a supporting artefact. Our epistemology is criteria-led, as In contrast, the ontological stance of this paper is also social-constructionist but any representation of financial reality is both self-referential and grounded on physical and legalistic evidence, which is why we advance the case for artefacts for intangible asset recognition purposes. In this case, the ontology draws upon Wand and Weber's (1995) "fundamental premise" to their work on information systems, specifically, that "a physical-symbol system has the necessary and sufficient properties to represent real-world meaning". Also, that "an information system is an artifactual representation of a real-world system as perceived by someone, built to perform information processing functions". In this regard, we break free from any abstract notion of "economic phenomena" (whatever that means?) and replace it with one that is physically and, in our case, legally grounded through the medium of artefacts.
As one can see from the columns in Table 1 , we apply those criteria to organisational 'assets': two intellectual property 'assets', that is, trademarks and trade secrets, and two infrastructure assets, that is, management processes and information systems, all taken from Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 here
These four 'assets' are predominantly intangible in nature and arguably draw their identity from the IC domain (see Edvinson and Malone, 1997) rather than the financial accounting domain where they would be unlikely to be reported as assets (see Upton, 2001 , p69 for list of separable intangible assets, also, Seetharaman et al,
2004
, p525 for a list of separable and inseparable intangible assets -an alternative to Table 2 perhaps?). There is nothing to stop the criteria being applied to all of the
An artefact is something that is given shape by man, in this case, the intangible intellectual creativity is given a surrogate tangible shape, typically though not exclusively, through documentation that assigns legal rights to an owner and/or user (see Honoré, 1961) . In the legal domain, as with the accounting domain, the alternative basis of using definitions are useful for instruction but any attempt to reduce judgements to deductions based on them could easily lead to the occasional miscarriage of justice because there are always exceptions. Nevertheless, the desire for the logic and structure offered by definitions, in whatever domain, is deeply rooted in the human psyche. Consider, for example, those used in medical diagnoses, for as Holmes (1897) suggests, the logical method and form flatter the longing for certainty that is in every human mind. Yet, the quest for certainty in any defined social construction is illusory because it is always contestable. In this regard, artefact-based asset recognition criteria are no different to a definitions-based approach and can only be advanced on the equally contestable basis that they offer a 'better' social construction. Table 2 and more. In that latter sense, it is unimportant as to whether Table   2 is comprehensive or not. So, for example, the criteria have already been applied to human assets in another paper (see Tollington and El-Tawy, 2010) . We apply the criteria to four identified organisational assets here simply because they have not been assessed before now and the choice is an arbitrary one.
As you can see from Table 1 , the artefact-based asset recognition criteria to be explored in this paper are presented in three groups based on the idea that an asset should be functional, separable and measurable. These three features are presented in the three circles in Figure 2 , the intersections between them being where the Insert Figure 2 here
The square boundary in Figure 2 encompasses all assets and within it the three intersecting circles represents the separable assets that could or should be recognisable for financial reporting purposes. The space between the circles and the square boundary represents those inseparable assets the recognition and measurement of which are indeterminate for financial reporting purposes. In this latter regard Figure 2 should cause one to think about 'assets' that are not separable, for example, goodwill, or 'assets' that are probably not measurable, for example, leadership skills, yet, both of these assets (if they be so) may impact upon the bottom line. It follows that the construction and use of artefact-based asset recognition criteria does not imply that they are either exclusive (all the attributes of an asset can be classified) or exhaustive (the attributes of an asset belong only to that element) in attempting to capture all the attributes of an asset (see Gröjer, 2001 where such approaches are regarded as a process of simplification).
To summarise this introductory section: Table 1 presents asset recognition criteria in three groups drawn from a tripartite structure presented in Figure 2 that will be explained and then applied later on in the paper to four of the organisational assets as extracted from Table 2 .
The subsequent structure of the paper
The next three sections of the paper are based upon the three groups of criteria presented in Table 1 as explained and then applied to the four identified organisational 'assets'. The final section thereafter presents a discussion about the merits, or otherwise, of using artefact-based asset recognition criteria.
An intangible asset's separable function ( Whilst the 'sum of the parts' should theoretically equal the 'whole', in practice this is somewhat problematic (see Barth, 2007) particularly when dealing with intangible assets because some of them, like goodwill, are inherently inseparable from the other assets of a business. Napier and Power (1992) do not try to recognise a separable function because they argue that many intangible asset valuation methods "determine, rather than depend upon, separability". Such comments tend to confirm the introductory assertion that in the accounting domain intangible asset measurement substitutes for intangible asset recognition. We disagree because an artefact may substitute for asset recognition purposes. The use of artefacts represents an expanded boundary for accountants but probably still a restrictive one to other interest groups including those from the IC domain. For example, as any marketer will tell you, a brand is more than its related trademark (see Aaker, 1991) . For example, as any HRM person will tell you, an employee is more than what they create. But the boundary has to be drawn somewhere and we do so by using
artefacts.
An intangible asset's measurable function (Table 1, Figure 2)
Since it is not intangible assets per se that are measurable, rather, their function (notably in respect of 'rights' previously), the specific function envisaged here is the capacity to increase or decrease business value through holding assets (capital gains or losses) or using assets (revenue gains or losses) to increase or decrease income (whether realised or not), the two types of increases or decreases being known together as comprehensive income (Bertoni and De Rosa, 2005; Cauwenberge and De Beelde, 2007; IASB, 2003; Newberry, 2003; Barker, 2004) . In accounting terms the recording of comprehensive income represents the increase in the value of all disclosed assets between two balance sheet dates and links directly to the concept of how capital is to be maintained by such means (see Hicks, 1939; Gynther, 1970; Revsine, 1981; Tweedie and Whittington, 1984; Guttierrez and Whittington, 1997; Arden, 2005) . Priority is given to balance sheet values rather than the income statement (see Paton and Littleton, 1940) . We support the theoretical notion of comprehensive income whilst also practically acknowledging that an intangible 'asset' may increase income and yet be financially un-measurable, for example, a Whilst we have briefly focused on one measurement method, DCF, in order to the highlight a selective application of the criteria, we do not intend to address the issue of an appropriate measure method because it is primarily an accounting problem.
The intention, instead, is to precondition ones view towards the process of asset measurement, which logically follows from the process of asset recognition, per the introductory paragraph to this paper. The relevant three criteria in this regard are presented in Tables 3l-n.
Insert Tables 3l-n here
That preconditioning though is of a normative nature. So, for example, despite our criterion that any measurement should be observable, it is entirely possible to construct an accounting approach based on predictive values if needs be and there would be plenty of models in the IC domain alone to choose from. In that regard consider the following brief review in Table 4 Insert Table 4 here
The principal feature of a 'separable measurement' is that any asset measurement should be both individual and additive so that, in principle, the measurement of 'the whole' disclosed picture of financial reality, however that is measured and represented, is equal to the 'sum of its individual disclosed parts', whether aggregated or disaggregated (see previous definition of separability). An individually purchased trademark, for example, may be easily aggregated with any other asset (the part is added to the whole) but when it is purchased as part of a business investment it may be somewhat difficult to disaggregate its separable value (splitting the whole into its parts). For the inseparable, non-artefact based intangible 'assets' the disaggregation problem is more acute, inherently so. However, if one reports to management at the highest level of a business investment then there is no problem because the overall economic function of that recorded investment potentially incorporates all the synergistic economic benefits from inseparable 'assets', such as from management processes (Table 2 ) and any related human 'assets'. It is only when that investment is disaggregated for accounting disclosure purposes that the above problem of measuring the inseparable intangible assets arises, which accountants partly try to solve by bundling them together under the generic heading of purchased goodwill.
The aggregation/disaggregation issue and the related double-counting issue, both previously, are clearly not easy ones to resolve. We argue that the lowest level of aggregation should be disclosed wherever appropriate so that the constituency of expenditures is known (criterion 3n). However, that constituency in respect of an intangible asset is unrecognisable in the absence of an artefact and therefore separately un-measurable if, to repeat, one accepts the previous a-priori logic of asset recognition before asset measurement.
A discussion about the contribution of this paper
If we look at Table 1 then, on the balance of 'No' to 'Yes' responses, we can dismiss trade secrets and management processes as assets. On the same basis we would accept trademarks and information systems as assets but of course the unanswered question is whether all the boxes have to be ticked 'Yes' for an asset to be confirmed. If that is so then the challenge lies in respects of criterion 3l and criterion 3m in Table 1 . In this regard, consider again the previous comments of
Arthur Andersen (1992) in Table 3m and the observation of compliance with a valuation method established by an accounting rule. This may well satisfy 'criterion m' but any valuation-based measurement is still likely to be non-additive (criterion 3l). Indeed, the accounting profession can never win in that regard because, as soon as one mixes money and time, money measurement over time becomes inherently non-additive if only because of the effects of inflation. All one can do is to limit that non-additivity by choosing one measurement basis in one time frame, for example, the value of an asset realised or replaced today.
Barth (2007, p12) rightly points out in respect of market based fair value measurements, that the sum of the balance sheet assets less liabilities is unlikely to equal the market value of the equity because not every 'asset' is recognisable. So, for example, we refer to 'assets' in the paper but the term lacks clarity such that some assets may have a role that is not only economic, for example, a company car used socially or public monuments (Mautz, 1988; Pallot, 1990) where heritage is as important as income. One may look at the 'prohibition of harmful use' criterion (criterion 1f) in a similar vain, that is, first, it appears to be out of character with the economic thrust of the other criteria and, second, it seems unlikely that this criteria would ever be categorised as anything other than a 'Yes' response. That said, just as the intangible wealth drivers in our economy have gathered pace over the past few decades (Quah, 1997), it seems likely that, as businesses compete for globally scarce resources, the issue of sustainability will come to the fore. Thus, the concept of 'harmful use' may actually spawn a whole subset of legal rights as social norms adjust to changing economic reality and our survival on this planet. We are already seeing that occurring in respect of carbon trading and, like the money metric and the time metric, the carbon metric is likely to be additive individually. There is also the consideration of whether these metrics can be mixed together too to form a completely new way of reporting assets?
In this paper we have stepped outside the accounting domain to look back into it on a fundamental aspect of accounting: asset recognition criteria that was considered once and rejected on the rather dubious grounds of introducing circularity (though no example was identified at the time -ASB, 1999). The advantage of our redrawn artefact-based boundary line, though, is that most transactions have one: an invoice, a payslip etc. In other words, artefact-based recognition is a broader basis for asset recognition, which can capture all that currently exists in the accounting domain and more (see Lev and Zarowin, 1999 on 'boundaries Many authors refer to IC in terms of a resource contributing to organisational performance (see Chatzkel, 2000a,b; Brennan and Connell, 2000; Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Carroll and Tansey, 2000; Hunt, 2003; Leliaert et.al, 2003; Guthrie, 2001; Chatzkel, 2001a,b; Seetharaman et.al, 2002 Seetharaman et.al, , 2004 Lim and Dallimore, 2004; Marr et.al, 2004; Pike et.al, 2005; Boedler et.al, 2005; Flostrand, 2006; O'Donnell et.al, 2006a,b; Jorgensen, 2006) . [c] They are all capable of transference with or without an artefact. The artefact, however, provides evidence in the same way that an invoice or payment transfer provides some evidence in the accounting domain, except that no actual business transaction has to necessarily occur. An accounting transaction is one form of actualisation of the 'capability of transference', a subset that probably has more to do with establishing a reliable separable measurement than this specific separable function. Thus, a eureka moment by someone working on a new cyclonic vacuum cleaner in his garden shed or the farmer who gains from the birthing of a calf or some unexpected find of mineral deposits on his land are all non-transactions-based assets capable of transference and future use. It can be reasonably argued, though, that the attachment of an artefact to each asset's 'capability of transference' is no better than the accounting approach in terms of establishing a separable function. All it does is to provide the aforementioned evidence: the patented cyclonic vacuum cleaner, the compulsory registering and tagging of the calf with DEFRA, the geologists technical report on the size, quality and value of the mineral deposit (except that in the case of the last two assets this is additional to their obvious tangible existence). 'Harmfulness' is a matter of social judgement. So, for example, a 'Auschwitz' brand would probably regarded as being harmful, at least to the Jewish community, whereas, the 'FCUK' brand might be regarded a being clever, rather than harmful, through its similarity to a sexual swearword. Only a fool would deliberately set out to instigate a hostile response to a brand -a self-imposed prohibition. Record 'yes'
A potentially harmful trade secret harms no one until it is used and when it is used, generally speaking, it is no longer a secret. An analysis of what has been used is usually sufficient in that regard.
Record 'no'
It is axiomatic that a harmful management process invites the possibility of legal sanctions. Equally, whatever is created or used by a person should not, in principle, be harmful to others. However, civil law is replete with instances where the principle fails in practice. Instances like Enron and Worldom show that management processes are often insufficient to combat errant social action. Indeed, they may even encourage it.
Record 'yes' in principle
There are plenty of examples of harmful information, for example, computer viruses, adult video gaming, illegal downloading, Chinese censoring of Google website etc. However, in each case prohibition is subject to the changeable social norms of the society using the information -harm to one party may be protection or a warped sense of fun to another.
Record 'yes' in principle Comprehends a particular use: settling debt. The sufficiency of an intangible asset for that purpose is a matter of agreement between the parties and social norms.
The artefact is important otherwise the intangible asset could potentially become a vehicle for defrauding creditors, and national income would suffer accordingly as those with liquid capital would be wary of lending it to those with assets lacking this proviso.
A high profile trademarked brand may well be accepted in settlement of a debt. Anyone with enough money can create a luxury car but there is only one Rolls Royce brand and it clearly had worth to BMW or they would not have bought it. A lender would know this too.
Record 'yes'
No artefact, no sufficiency for intended purpose.
Record 'no'
Management is vested in human beings and human beings cannot to used to settle debt unless one believes in slavery.
Record 'no'
Social norms governing privacy of information are central to establishing the worth available to settle debt. A banking IT system, whilst the mainstay of the business, probably has no value to anyone else. But the information contained therein (customer details), is a different matter providing privacy laws allowed access. Other systems eg. Windows Vista -the artefactcould probably be securitised on the basis of a recognisable income steam, which could then be used to settle debt. Record 'yes' Table 3h : Right to a residuary character General Description Trademarks Trade Secrets Management processes Information systems Refers to a situation where the rights to use or control lapses. There must be social rules for deciding what to do, for whatever reason, where the pre-existing legal rights to an intangible asset are no longer present. For some intangible assets there is no residuary character eg. expiration of a patent. For others, they may be periodically renewed eg. trademark registration. For others, the right may be passed after death eg. copyright.
The statutory expiration of a trademark unless renewed.
Brands may still be protected under the tort of passing off.
Record 'yes'
Record 'no'
Management is vested in human beings and there is no residuary character if a person decides to manage nothing (or even dies!). The right must be of an involuntary nature.
The right must of an involuntary nature separate from the person, such as copyrighted documents (the artefact), which can endure beyond death. Fisher (1906, p52) refers to capital as "a stock of wealth existing at an instant in time", Salvary (1997) refers instead to a "stock of money" expressed in nominal terms. In both cases capital is interpreted in financial reporting terms as a positive difference of assets over liabilities at the year-end. The amount of that positive difference depends on ones view of capital maintenance.
Record 'yes'
A measurable function is triggered by the existence of, and is traceable to, an artefact: the separable product of utilising the human 'asset' -the process of structuralisation (Johnson, 2002) : turning human capital into structural capital (see also Edvinson and Malone, 1997; Johnson, 1999; Stewart, 1997 , Carson et al, 2004 ) though this is not always associated
The constituent nature of brand equity (Aaker, 1991, p16 ) is more broadly based than in respect of the artefact based focus of this paper. Wood (1995, p550) , though, in referring to de Chernatony and McDonald (1992) , adopts the 'stock of wealth' argument in that brands represent a source of "added value" (see also Wood, 1996) . However, where marketers and accountants differ would undoubtedly be in the recognition of the added value from such abstract sources as identified by Aaker (1991 ) -see Keller, (1993 about the different motivations of accountants and marketers. From the accounting perspective the only physically verifiable brand equity attribute is in A well known leading cancer specialist who declares that he/she may has a cure for the disease may well be paid a considerable sum for what only they know -the drug formula -but as soon as they reveal their secret the capital is instantly dissipated, the right then being held in many hands unless someone quickly establishes a patent right instead. There is no right to capital in the secret but there may be a right in a secret that is then revealed. In that instance in time the capital is immediately converted into income and both are lost Adam Smith (1776) argued the case for "investments" in human beings -an input orientation (see also, Alfred Marshall, 1890, p469; OECD, 1996 That is electronic transference that requires physical retention (eg. a CD) to evidence the 'right'. It is the value of the artefact that is problematic, labour cost being a poor but easily measured substitute in that regard.
[d] It is acknowledged though that this output orientation cannot be completely divorced from an input orientation because there is an obvious 'chicken and egg' type argument here: without the human being in the first place there is no thought, no purpose and no possibility of action.
with the existence of an artefact in the intellectual capital domain.
respect of the trademark.
Record 'yes' thereafter.
Record 'yes' 1a).
Record 'no'
Record 'yes' Comprehends the right to alienate an asset, or to consume it, or to destroy or waste it, or by any other means, discharge it and thereby deny oneself the right to appropriate.
The oil rich owners of a patent for a safe, cheap, compact and highly efficient source of generating electricity may, in their own interest, simply not use it. Thus it may exist as an artefact and it may have the potential to produce great wealth and yet, in practice, never do so -an entity specific, not a market specific viewpoint (see IASB, 2005b, p51 Record 'yes' (ASB, 1999, p79; IASB, 2001 , para.100, IASB, 2005a or when they are mixed with non-financial metrics.
Choose one financial measurement basis at one point in time (now, not past, not future). "As a rule, human potential is not expressed in terms of monetary units…The same applies to investments in human potential (Milost, 2007, p124) The same cannot be said for many valuation based methods where the time frame is often future based and therefore not observable. It is the time frame that is pertinent because even transactionsbased cost becomes a sub-set of valuation-based methods over time. The obvious problem of observing something that is intangible is obviated through the use of physical substitutes: artefacts. Whether one would be prepared, for example, to accept the observed securitisation of a music copyright artefact or the observed royalties paid for the use of a trademark artefact or the options to do so as a valid approach for all such assets is unclear, but it is not beyond the 'wit of man' to make it so, or some other model, through the accounting regulatory process.
The observation process can be one of verifying regulatory compliance in the use of a 'selected valuation method' without material error in the way the measurement is conducted -a process of indirect verification. Of course, the unresolved problem is which method constitutes 'the best' measurement method in the first place -a process of direct verification (see IASB, 2006b; Barth, 2007, p14 Record 'no'
The separable measurement of past and current income from some artefacts, like CD-based gaming software, may be easy to observe. For other information systems, the income may be nonexistent, for example, encoded NHS patient records -an observed zero value perhaps? In both cases the artefacts are observed and based on labour outputs, not inputs. The issue then becomes whether the measurement of capital should be based on the observed measurements of income, above. The short answer is 'no' -see Damant (ASB, 1995, previously) . It follows that any observation of the value of the artefacts will have to be a process of indirect verification -same as trademarks. Again, a difficult one to categorise. On balance, currently... Record 'no'
[e] The implications for future based valuations such as value-in-use, forecasts, some allocations and even some accounting standards (for example, cash generating units as part of impairment reviews) are extensive. It is interesting to note that a recent IASB definition of an asset provides some tentative support for this point:"An asset of an entity is a present right, or other access, to an existing economic resource with the ability to generate economic benefits to the entity" (IASB, 2006c , IASB Update, December 2007 Reference is made in this quote to "present" and "existing" and no mention is made to "future" economic benefits. However, those "economic benefits" are still not articulated in terms of a single measurement method. So, for example, if a net realisable value method to accounting is chosen by standard setters (see IASB, 2006a) , then, in implicitly referring to a future sale (unless actually realized today), the mix of time frames (present and future) would still apply even though this future is not explicitly contained in the above definition. Also note that the element of "control" is now missing from the definition: a criterion in this paper. Note, also the opposite situation: that the issue of a "resource" (see Hall, 1991 Hall, , 1992 ) is missing as a criterion herein because, to repeat, the need to specify what a resource is by nature simply replaces the need to specify what an asset is by nature (see Weetman, 1989) . 
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A separable measurement should be tied to a single asset, rather than as a bundle, otherwise, it may be possible to inadvertently dispose of or discharge individual assets, notably the intangible ones, whilst leaving the measurement of the bundle intact.
In the absence of an artefact (the traceable object) there is a danger, particularly in respect of intangible assets, that one may end up disclosing the measurement of something that has little or no function let alone a separable function. It is acknowledged, though, that this could be a practical problem for many compound financial derivatives.
The most controversial criterion because, according to Aaker (1991), brand equity is a "set of assets" ie. bundled, and virtually impossible to un-bundle and measure separately. We do not try. Politically one must decide an appropriate lowest level of aggregation or, perhaps more appropriately, disaggregation at which to report assets (is it bricks and mortar or is a building?). Our decision is based upon the trademark artefact. Whatever marketing "asset" that may or may not be attached thereto (eg. name awareness) is ignored in the accounting domain. Record 'yes'
No need to do so.
Record no
No artefact, therefore, nothing to bundle.
The sum of the value of the CD copyrights on the individual Harry Potter films will probably be greater than the boxed set when all of them have been released. And a clever business person knows how to obtain value individually and/or when bundled. Likewise with any component software of an integrated system. The key feature is the artefact (the traceable object) because this establishes user rights to the intangible asset whether individual or bundled. The unresolved problem though is how to remove duplication when trying to establish a separable measurement for one or the other or, perhaps, both at the same time.
Record 'yes'
